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In this paper we propose a novel method to forecast the result of elections
using only official results of previous ones. It is based on the voter model with
stubborn nodes and uses theoretical results developed in a previous work of
ours. We look at popular vote shares for the Conservative and Labour parties
in the UK and the Republican and Democrat parties in the US. We are able
to perform time-evolving estimates of the model parameters and use these to
forecast the vote shares for each party in any election. We obtain a mean
absolute error of 4.74%. As a side product, our parameters estimates provide
meaningful insight on the political landscape, informing us on the quantity of
voters that are strongly pro and against the considered parties.
Keywords. Elections, voter model, opinion dynamics, Markov chains, social
networks.
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1 Introduction
For decades, modern democratic societies have been polling populations to try and track
the popularity of elections candidates and members of governments. Those are often
conducted by means of phone, online or even in person surveys, which can be very time-
consuming and and usually suffer from limited sample sizes and bias – e.g. respondants
with controversial views might be reluctant of sharing them. This is why different methods
are being investigated nowadays. With the rapid growth of online social platforms such
as Facebook or Twitter, any individual can now publicly express their views and opinions,
adding to an evergrowing pool of directly accessible data. This has open the door for a new
avenue of research, that seeks to use this precious resource to forecast polls and election
results without having to survey the population.
As of today, most efforts have focused on applying machine learning methods such as
sentiment analysis to evaluate public opinion through samples of Twitter data and try to
predict the outcome of democratic processes around the globe (Saleiro et al., 2016; Garcia
et al., 2018; Grimaldi et al., 2020). The quality of predictions spans a rather wide range
and numerous voices have expressed concerns over these methods, arguing that there are
multiple factors at play that may alter their reliability (Gayo-Avello, 2012; Jungherr et al.,
2017). This is why in this work we propose a novel method that does not rely on data
analysis but rather uses the authentic and official results of previous elections to perform
estimation for future ones.
More precisely, we consider the well-known voter model for opinion dynamics. A popu-
lation of connected nodes form a graph where some of them are in state 0 and some others
in state 1. Nodes can then randomly change state over time following the distribution of
others’ states. Nodes are usually meant to represent users on a social network and states
their opinions or views. This model then allows to describe in a simple and intuitive man-
ner social dynamics where people are divided between two parties and form their opinion
by observing that of others around them. A previous work of ours was dedicated to the
theoretical study of this model in the specific case where everyone is influenced by every-
one else and some users are stubborn and never change opinion (Vendeville et al., 2020).
Notably, we provided closed-form expressions for the distribution of opinions at any point
in the process and convergence time to equilibrium.
This paper is a follow-up of that work, as we apply our previous findings to forecast
results of both general elections in the United Kingdom and presidential elections in the
United States. We consider the share of popular votes won by either the Conservative and
Labour party – or Republican and Democratic party in the US – as a representation of node
states in a fictional graph and perform time-evolving estimation of optimal parameters for
the corresponding voter model. This allows us to obtain a theoretical distribution for the
number of seats or votes, from which we draw the expected result of future elections. We
compare with real-life outcomes to assess the viability of our approach.
2 Related Literature
A number of research projects have focused on applying machine learning algorithms to
Twitter data in order to forecast opinion poll results or election outcomes. We discuss some
of them here and refer the interested reader to (Gayo-Avello, 2013; Phillips et al., 2017) for
more in-depth reviews of the literature. A pioneer work in this area was that of Tumasjan
et al. (2011) whose model achieved a mean average error (MAE) of 1.65% when predicting
results of the 2009 German federal election. Authors used Twitter mention counts as an
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direct indicator of a candidate’s popularity, a method that has been considered by several
other works as well, often in combination with a sentiment analysis of tweets content
(O’Connor et al., 2010; Saleiro et al., 2016; Garcia et al., 2018; Grimaldi et al., 2020;
Fink et al., 2013; Huberty, 2013; Caldarelli et al., 2014; Thapen and Ghanem, 2013). In
particular, Garcia et al. (2018) achieved 90% accuracy in predicting the top two candidates
in various municipalities during Brazilian municipal elections, and Saleiro et al. (2016)
achieved a MAE of 0.63% when trying to predict opinion poll results during the Portuguese
bailout (2011-2014).
The relevance of such approaches has however been questioned by a number of authors
(Fink et al., 2013; Huberty, 2013; Caldarelli et al., 2014; Thapen and Ghanem, 2013;
Jungherr et al., 2012, 2017; Gayo-Avello, 2012). Jungherr et al. (2012) showed that merely
changing the timeframe of forecast in the work of Tumasjan et al. (2011) would invalidate
the results. Fink et al. (2013) found that use of Twitter mentions mirrored actual popu-
larity of only some of the candidates but not all of them. Jungherr et al. (2017) argued
that mentions count, used in most of the works cited above, show evidence of attention to
politics rather that support to the actual candidates. This is why researchers often com-
bine mentions count with sentiment analysis algorithms, but even these can have trouble
detecting and correctly interpreting all subtelties of the human language. This particular
concern, has been raised by several authors (Huberty, 2013; Caldarelli et al., 2014; Gayo-
Avello, 2012). Self-selection, i.e. the fact that people choose whether to express their views
online or not, may also bias results. Add to it the rife presence of bots on the Twitter
platform and it is difficult to say for sure whether the online population is an accurate
representation of the real one.
Some researchers have thus considered different avenues, drawing features from the Twit-
ter user graph topology (Dokoohaki et al., 2015), hashtags co-occurences (Bovet et al.,
2018) or even discarding the social platform entirely and using fluctuations of the Pound
to forecast the popularity of the Conservative party in the UK (Usher and Dondio, 2020).
Integrating in this line of works, we build a model that does not rely on Twitter but
rather uses official results of previous elections to guess the outcome of future ones. Our
model is a variant of the celebrated voter model, where nodes on a graph are in one of
two possible states and repeatedly update their beliefs to agree with other nodes chosen
at random. It was introduced independently by Holley and Liggett (1975) and Clifford
and Sudbury (1973) in the context of particles interaction. They proved that consensus
is reached, i.e. that every node is eventually in the same state, on the infinite Zd lattice.
Several works have since looked at different network topologies: complete graphs (Hassin
and Peleg, 2002; Sood et al., 2008; Perron et al., 2009; Yildiz et al., 2010), Erdös-Rényi
random graphs (Sood et al., 2008; Yildiz et al., 2010), scale-free random graphs (Sood
et al., 2008; Fernley and Ortgiese, 2019), and other various structures (Yildiz et al., 2010;
Sood et al., 2008). Variants where nodes deterministically update to the most common
state amongst their neighbours have also been studied (Chen and Redner, 2005; Mossel
et al., 2014).
In this paper we consider the specific case where stubborn nodes who never switch state
are present in the graph. Such nodes may for example represent lobbyists, politicians or
activists, i.e. entities looking to lead rather than follow and who will not easily change
side. One of those placed within the network can singlehandedly change the outcome of
the process (Mobilia, 2003; Sood et al., 2008). If several of them are present on both
sides, consensus is usually not reachable and instead the distribution of states converge
to an equilibrium in which it fluctuate indefinitely (Mobilia et al., 2007; Yildiz et al.,
2013). Recently, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2020) considered nodes with different degrees of
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stubbornness and show that time to reach consensus grows linearly with their number.
Klamser et al. (2017) studied the effect of stubborn nodes on a dynamically evolving
graph, and show that the two main factors shaping their influence are their degrees and the
dynamical rewiring probabilities. Finally, in our previous work we developed closed-form
formulas for the distribution of opinion at any step and convergence time to equilibrium
in the case where stubborn nodes are present in a strongly connected network (Vendeville
et al., 2020).
Our contributions. In this paper we propose a new model for the forecast of elections
outcome, based on official results of previous elections. Our method is based on the voter
model with stubborn nodes and uses theoretical results developed in a previous work of
ours (Vendeville et al., 2020). We apply it to the United Kingdom general elections and in
the United States presidential elections and achieve an MAE of 4.74%. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first time such work is conducted. All code used is available online.
3 Theoretical background
Here we present the mathematical framework behind our forecasting method. In the tradi-
tional voter model, we consider a group of n nodes labelled 1, . . . , n who are each in state 0
or 1. These states are prone to change over time and we let xiptq denote the state of node
i at time t. Each node has access to the state of some of the others, called its neighbours.
Nodes can then be seen as forming a graph of size n, with an edge from j from i if and only
if i has access to the state of j. Here we consider this graph to be a clique with unweighted
edges and no self-loops. Thus each node accounts for the state of every other, except their
own, with no particular preference. The process then unfolds as follows. Starting with
a given initial distribution of states, an independent exponential clock of parameter 1 is
associated to each node. Whenever a clock rings, the concerned node changes its state to
that of one of its neighbours selected uniformly at random — or equivalently, chooses its
new state by sampling the distribution of its neighbours’ states.
We let N1ptq denote the number of state-1 holders at time t; it will be our quantity of
interest. Note that the number of state-0 nodes at time t is given by n´N1ptq. We assume
N1p0q is fixed and let n1 denote its value. We are interested in the particular situation
where some of the nodes are stubborn, that is never change state, and we describe the
evolution of N1ptq over time. We denote by s0 and s1 the numbers of stubborn state-0 and
state-1 nodes respectively and require at least one of them to be strictly positive. To this
end we define
Sn “ tpa, bq P t0, . . . , nu2 : 0 ă a` b ď nu (1)
and require ps0, s1q P Sn. We write rmijsi,j to denote the matrix with entry mij in the i-th
row and j-th column and let eM denote the exponential of any matrix M .
Because s0 and s1 nodes will always be in respective states 0 and 1 no matter what,
N1ptq is comprised between s1 and n ´ s0 for all t. The idea behind our analysis is that
it describes a birth-and-death process over the state-space ts1, . . . , n´ s0u with transition
rates, for all s1 ď k ď n´ s0,$’&’%
qk,k´1 “ pk ´ s1qpn´ kq{pn´ 1q
qk,k`1 “ kpn´ k ´ s0q{pn´ 1q
qk,k “ ´qk,k´1 ´ qk,k`1.
(2)
Indeed to move from state k to k ´ 1 we need a non stubborn state-1 node to adopt the
state of an state-0 node. There are k´s1 non stubborn state-1 nodes and for each of these,
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a proportion pn´kq{pn´1q of the others is in state 0, hence qk,k´1 “ pk´s1qpn´kq{pn´1q.
We obtain qk,k`1 via an analogous reasoning and define qk,k “ ´qk,k`1 ´ qk,k´1. Since the
process only evolves by unit increments or decrements, qk,j “ 0 if j R tk ´ 1, k, k ` 1u. As
expected we have qs1,s1´1 “ 0 and qn´s0,n´s0`1 “ 0. Finally we let Q “ rqijsi,j denote the
transition rate matrix. From there we are able to compute the distribution of N1ptq and
its expected value at any point in time.
Theorem 1. Let Q be the matrix with entries described in (2) and let N1p0q “ n1 be given.
Assuming ps0, s1q P Sn is the repartition of stubborn nodes, the probability for N1 to equal
k at time t is
pn1,kptq :“ retQsn1,k. (3)
Hence,
EN1ptq “
n´s0ÿ
k“s1
k pn1,kptq. (4)
is the expected number of state-1 nodes at time t.
Because there are stubborn agents in both camps, consensus is never reached and instead
the system indefinitely fluctuates within a state of equilibrium. We would like to know if
the political system we consider can be considered to be within such state. To this end,
the long term expectation of N1ptq is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assuming ps0, s1q P Sn is the repartition of stubborn agents, the expected
number of opinion-1 holders at equilibrium is given by
Epi “ n s1
s0 ` s1 (5)
where pi “ ppis1 , . . . , pin´s0q denotes the steady-state distribution of N1ptq.
The theory has been developed in our previous work (Vendeville et al., 2020) to which
we refer the interested reader for more details and proof of Theorems 1, 2. We also provide
a closed-form formula for the computation of convergence time.
4 Setup
We use the official database of the United Kingdom general elections results, published by
the House of Commons (Audickas et al., 2020), as well as results for presidential elections
in the United States manually collected from Wikipedia.1 Each time we are interested in
the percentage of popular votes won by the two major parties – Conservative and Labour
in the UK, Republicans and Democrats in the US. We assume these quantities correspond
to pointwise observations of independent realisations of the voter model. The result of
each election can then be forecast via Theorem 1, provided we have an estimate of the
quantity of stubborn nodes ps0, s1q. Thus, our analysis is done in two steps: first we make
for each elections an estimate of ps0, s1q based on previous results, then Equation 4 gives
us the expected value for the coming election that we use as a predictor.
In the UK dataset, our quantity of interest is the percentage of popular votes won by the
Conservative and Labour parties in each general elections from 1922 onwards. In the US
dataset, it is the number of popular votes gathered by Republicans and Democrats in each
presidential elections from 1912 onwards. For the sake of clarity we present our method in
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election#Popular_vote_results
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the UK case, but note that it directly translates to the US case by replacing Conservative
and Labour with Republicans and Democrats.
Because our model cannot account for decimal values values we round the percentages to
the nearest integer. Different parties are present, the two major ones being Conservative2
and Labour, the rest including Liberal Democrats or Social Nationalists amongst others.
Because our model applies to a two-sided situation only, we cannot consider all of them at
once. Thus, we aggregate all non-Conservative parties under the label 0 while Conservatives
are attributed label 1. We let xi denote the number of seats won by Conservatives on the
ith elections and ti the elapsed time, in years, since the starting point 1922. There have
been m “ 27 elections total, with the last one taking place in 2019. Thus t1 “ 0 and
tm “ 2019´1922 “ 97. We let xm denote the percentage of seats won by the conservatives
in 2019. To concur with our theoretical framework we consider one seat won by the
Conservatives (resp. non-Conservatives) as the observation of an node being in state 1
(resp. 0) amongst n “ 100 of them. The xi’s then correspond to pointwise observations
at times ti’s of a realisation of the process N1ptq described in section 3. All the reasoning
described here and in the following will also be applied independently in the cases Labour
versus non-Labour, Republican versus non-Republican (US) and Democrat versus non-
Democrat (US).
5 Methodology
To be able to use Theorem 1 to make predictions, we first need to estimate the proportion
of potential stubborn nodes in the population, that is the percentage of votes which are
guaranteed for or against Conservatives. Let s0 denote the number of stubborn state-0
(non-Conservative) nodes and s1 that of state-1 (Conservative) ones. We look for the
values ps‹0, s‹1q that maximise the log-likelihood of the observed data. Let’s say we want to
predict results for the ith election. Because we need at least two datapoints to make an
estimaation, we require 3 ď i ď m ` 1. Following the notations introduced in section 3
we let pps0,s1qk,l ptq denote the theoretical probability for N1ptq to go from k to l in t units of
time when there are respectively s0 and s1 state-0 and state-1 stubborn nodes. We seek
to solve
argmax
s0,s1
i´2ÿ
j“1
log
´
pps0,s1qxj ,xj`1ptj`1 ´ tjq
¯
(6)
Indeed, pps0,s1qxj ,xj`1ptj`1 ´ tjq is by definition the probability for Conservatives to win xj`1
percent of the votes in the pj ` 1qth election knowing they won xj percent in the jth one.
Thus we seek to simultaneously maximise the likelihood of all past elections results. Let
Qps0,s1q be the matrix with entries calculated via (2). By Theorem 1, we have that (6) is
equivalent to
argmax
s0,s1
i´2ÿ
j“1
log
”
eptj`1´tjqQps0,s1q
ı
xj ,xj`1
(7)
The computation of matrix exponential is typically done in cubic time and quickly becomes
intractable as the size of the matrix increases. Here however, because we have n “ 100, the
2The dataset also includes in Conservative results: National, National Liberal and National Labour can-
didates for 1931-1935; National and National Liberal candidates for 1945; National Liberal candidates
from 1945 to 1970.
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number of possible couples ps0, s1q is small enough here that (7) can be solved by directly
computing the sum for each of these couples individually. The optimal value s‹1 for s1
then gives us an estimation of the percentage of votes “locked” by the Conservative party,
proportion of the population that will always root for them. The optimal value s‹0 for s0
is an estimate of the quantity of such votes for all other parties aggregated.
To make a forecast for the ith election, we just have to apply Theorem 1 withQ “ Qps‹0,s‹1q,
n1 “ xi´1 and t “ ti ´ ti´1. Equation 4 then gives us the expected percentage x˜i of votes
gathered by Conservatives on that occasion. This can then be compared to the actual
value xi to assess the efficacy of our approach.
6 Results for the UK
We show in Table 1 (left) the estimated values for ps‹0, s‹1q, updated with each new election.
They seem to globally stabilise between 15 and 25 for both parties. Look at the last value
in the Labour case for example, which is p24, 15q. According to our model, this means
there is an estimated proportion of 15% of voters that will always vote Labour. On the
other side, 24% of voters are found to be stubborn “anti-Labour” – by that we don’t mean
that they are fundamentally against the Labour party but rather that they will never vote
for it. Note that these estimates fluctuate according to the variability of the data. For
example in 1922 and 1923 there were twice in a row 38% votes for Conservative3 and as a
result it was estimated that 38% of all voters are stubborn pro-Conservative and the 62%
are stubborn against the party. This is indeed what maximises the likelihood, with this
configuration yielding a probability of 1 for the observed values. On the other hand, with
pro-Conservative votes jumping from 38% to 61% in 1935, estimated values of s0 and s1
dropped significantly to account for the wide range covered by the data.
In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we compare our predictions, that is the expectations x˜i, with
the real outcomes xi. We plot both values for each election starting with the third one
that took place in 1924, because the optimisation problem (7) requires i ě 3. For both
parties, most values seem to fluctuate around the 40% mark. The global tendency of the
real outcomes looks respected by the predictions, albeit with less variability. Also note
that most predictions appear to be within a ˘5% vicinity of the real values.
To get a better insight we look at the absolute errors |x˜i ´ xi| of our predictions. We
plot running averages over the last 5 elections in Figure 5. After a few erratic first years
they seem to stabilise between 2 and 8%. More precisely, if we discard the first few years
up until 1960 where the model lacks sufficient amount of data to properly calibrate, we
get MAEs of respectively 4.63% and 5.23% for Conservative and Labour. Minimal values
of 0.06% for Conservatives in 1979 and 0.40% for Labour in 2001 are observed, showing
that our method was able to make very accurate predictions in these cases. Surprisingly
however, the errors do not seem to monotically decrease over time, but rather fluctuate.
As a matter of facts, peak absolute errors were observed in 1983 (Labour, 13.0%) and 1997
(Conservative, 13.6%).
7 Results for the US
We apply the exact method described above to the case of presidential elections in the
United States. As we did before we independently consider two cases, Republicans versus
3Remember that those value are rounded to the nearest integer to fit the needs of our model – the actual
results were 38.5% and 38%.
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non-Republicans and Democrats versus non-Democrats. Presidential elections in the US
take place every 4 years and we start with the year 1912, then 1920, 1924, and so on. Here
again, keep in mind that due to how the American system work, the party with the most
popular votes does not necessarily win the elections. The first estimation we are able to
make is based on the first two elections and thus our first prediction is for 1924.
We observe similar results as in the UK case. Stubborn values (Table 1, right) estimated
ps‹0, s‹1q are close, albeit a little bit lower – stabilising at (18,17) for Republicans and (16,14)
for Democrats. Regarding the predictions (Figure 3, Figure 4) we again see a majority
of them within a 5% margin from the actual outcomes, and a prediction curve that looks
more stable than the slightly spiky ones with real values. Note that because of the two-
party system in place in the United States, both Republicans and Democrats see their
share of popular votes fluctuate around the 50% mark. In the previous case, it was rather
around 40% because of the space occupied by smaller parties such as Liberal Democrats or
Scottish National Party amongst others. The two-sided aspect of our model – always one
party (0) versus another (1) – may thus be more adapted to the study of the US system.
As for the errors, running averages over the last 5 elections are shown in Figure 6. Here
again after a few erratic first years values appear to be comprised between 2 and 8%.
However, where errors in the UK case seemed to increase in the last few years, here they
to are dropping down. In fact, our most accurate forecast regarding Democrat votes is for
2016, with only 0.04% error. For Republicans it is in 1940 with 0.10%. Peak errors were
again around 13% for both parties, in 1972 (Republicans, 14.0%) and 1964 (Democrats,
12.3%). The MAE over all elections, starting in 1940 when forecasts start to stabilise, is
4.27% for Republicans and 4.83% for Democrats. This is slightly better than in the UK
case (4.63% and 5.23%). The MAE error over both cases is then 4.74%.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we proposed a new method for the forecast of elections results. A lot of
published work have used Twitter data for this purpose, usually applying machine learning
algorithm to extract sentiment from tweets and estimate a candidate’s popularity this way.
Such methods have been criticised in the past few years, with problem ranging from bot
presence to text mining reliability that cast doubt over their reliability. As such, our model
does not rely on Twitter data at all. Instead, we used official results of past elections in
the United Kingdom and in the United States to try and predict outcomes of future ones.
Our method is based on findings from a previous work of ours, where we conducted a
theoretical analysis of the voter model with stubborn on strongly-connected graphs. Here
we applied those in the case to try and predict the percentage of popular votes won by
Conservative and Labour parties in the United Kingdom, and the percentage of popular
votes collected by the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. To do so,
we considered official results of past elections as observations of independent realisations
of the voter model. From there we were able to perform time-evolving estimates of the
model parameters and use them to forecast an outcome.
Our model yielded an MAE of 4.74%, reaching absolute errors as low as 0.04% and
as high as 14%. In their review, Gayo-Avello (2013) suggest that any model used to
predict the elections outcome should not have an MAE higher than 1 or 2%. This is
because the result of an election is more often than not the matter of just a few percents.
According to this standard, our MAE is not low enough to reliably predict the outcome
of an election. Some previous works reached error averages as low as 0.63 (Saleiro et al.,
2016) and 1.65% (Tumasjan et al., 2011). Additionally, we tested our method against the
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baseline of systematically predict the exact result of the previous election. This simple
method returned an overal 5.03% average error, which is not much worse than the 4.74%
obtained via our method. Moreover, the first few elections results were discarded in both
cases, as it was deemed that the model did not have enough data at this point to make
predictions with a high enough confidence. The choice of a limit though is made on the
basis of our observation of the model’s behaviour and is purely subjective. Changing the
limit would in turn make for different results that might be better or worse.
Although our method did not prove to yield significant enough results here, we believe
it is an interesting step in a novel direction. Despite some impressive accomplishments,
there is lot of controversy regarding Twitter-based forecasting which is deemed unreliable
by a lot of authors. Thus our method that uses results of previous elections provides a
new take on the matter, which only relies on official data. Also our model does not only
forecast the elections results, it also gives us estimates of the quantity of stubborn voters
that are firmly pro or against any given party. This provides meaningful insight on the
political landscape of the considered areas.
Several extensions of the model could be considered to improve its accuracy. First of
all, adding in-between election polls to the data would go a long way in improving the
estimates. With a few years gap from one election to another, it is too wide a range of
possibilites for the model to account for. Second, one could take a deeper look into the past
of a country’s results adn try to detect tendancies about landslide victories, incumbency
reelection and so forth. We believe that having a deeper understanding of the specific
country one is working with could substantially improve the model calibration process.
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Figure 1: Percentage of popular votes for Conservatives in the UK, prediction and reality.
The shaded area covers a ˘5% deviation away from the predictions.
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Figure 2: Percentage of popular votes for Labour in the UK, prediction and reality. The
shaded area covers a ˘5% deviation away from the predictions.
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Figure 3: Percentage of popular votes for Republicans in the US, prediction and reality.
The shaded area covers a ˘5% deviation away from the predictions.
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Figure 4: Percentage of popular votes for Democrats in the US, prediction and reality. The
shaded area covers a ˘5% deviation away from the predictions.
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Figure 5: Absolute error between prediction and reality for the UK elections, running av-
erage over the last 5 elections.
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Figure 6: Absolute error between prediction and reality for the US elections, running av-
erage over the last 5 elections.
14
Year Conservative Labour
1924 (62, 38) (65, 30)
1929 (20, 21) (61, 30)
1931 (28, 20) (55, 30)
1935 (1, 5) (53, 27)
1945 (9, 10) (48, 26)
1950 (11, 10) (26, 17)
1951 (13, 12) (23, 16)
1955 (13, 12) (23, 16)
1959 (15, 14) (22, 16)
1964 (16, 15) (25, 18)
1966 (18, 16) (25, 18)
1970 (18, 16) (24, 18)
1974 (19, 17) (26, 19)
1974 (19, 16) (26, 19)
1979 (19, 16) (26, 19)
1983 (20, 17) (28, 20)
1987 (20, 17) (22, 15)
1992 (22, 18) (21, 14)
1997 (22, 18) (23, 15)
2001 (19, 15) (24, 16)
2005 (18, 14) (24, 16)
2010 (17, 13) (24, 16)
2015 (18, 13) (22, 14)
2017 (18, 13) (22, 14)
2019 (19, 14) (22, 14)
2024 (19, 14) (24, 15)
Year Republicans Democrats
1920 (23, 23) (44, 42)
1924 (15, 21) (18, 12)
1928 (18, 23) (15, 8)
1932 (18, 23) (18, 11)
1936 (16, 18) (10, 8)
1940 (13, 13) (7, 7)
1944 (14, 14) (9, 8)
1948 (15, 15) (9, 8)
1952 (17, 16) (10, 9)
1956 (16, 16) (11, 10)
1960 (16, 16) (11, 10)
1964 (17, 17) (12, 11)
1968 (17, 16) (10, 10)
1972 (17, 16) (12, 11)
1976 (15, 15) (11, 10)
1980 (16, 16) (12, 11)
1984 (16, 16) (13, 11)
1988 (16, 16) (13, 11)
1992 (16, 16) (14, 12)
1996 (15, 15) (14, 12)
2000 (16, 15) (15, 13)
2004 (16, 15) (15, 13)
2008 (16, 16) (15, 13)
2012 (17, 16) (16, 14)
2016 (17, 16) (16, 14)
2020 (18, 17) (16, 14)
Table 1: Evolution of the estimates for the proportion of stubborn agents ps‹0, s‹1q over time.
Left: United Kingdom. Right: United States.
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